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Abstract 
The approval of NASDAQ’s SuperMontage was described by the Chairman of the SEC 
Arthur Levitt in the following manner: “In my tenure, there has been no more time-
consuming, controversial or divisive proposed rule-change than the SuperMontage”. Due 
to its form and the functionalities it offers, SuperMontage raises issues in relation to 
market structure, fragmentation and competition. This article describes SuperMontage in 
the context of the U.S. securities markets and the potential of SuperMontage on those 
markets, in particular in the context of electronic communications networks. 
 
 
*200 I. Introduction 
The approval of NASDAQ's SuperMontage by the Securities and Exchange Commission 
(SEC) in January 2001 [FN1] was very controversial. The new system raises various 
issues, in particular in relation to the organisation of the securities markets. As 
SuperMontage has just become fully operational, [FN2] its practical consequences still are 
unknown. 
This article provides a brief description of the Nasdaq system and of SuperMontage 
within the framework of the American securities markets. It deals only with aspects of the 
markets which are relevant to SuperMontage: the definition of an exchange, the auction 
and dealer markets, the over-the-counter market and Nasdaq. There is then a brief 
analysis and evaluation of the SuperMontage system and of its potential future effects on 
market structure and, in particular, an Electronic Communications Network (ECN). Finally, 
the article expresses the view that SuperMontage will have positive effects on the markets. 
As to the role of supervisory authorities, it stresses that they should not directly intervene 




1. Definition of Exchange 
The Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (SEA) defines the term "exchange" in section 
3(a)(1). [FN3] The definition has been modernised and adapted following the introduction 
of the rules for Alternative Trading Systems (ATS) in 1998. [FN4] In particular, it has been 
expanded in order to cover new requirements resulting from the electronisation of the 
securities markets. 
The new Rule 3b-16(a) [FN5] interprets key language in the statutory definition of 
exchange. Two main features characterise an exchange, which as an organisation, 
association or group of persons:  
-- brings together the orders of multiple buyers and sellers,  
-- uses established, non-discretionary methods (whether by providing a trading 
facility or by setting rules) under which such orders interact which each other, and the 
buyers and sellers entering such orders agree to the terms of a trade.  
Rule 3b-16 has a dual function: it not only clarifies the applicability of the definition of 
"exchange" to ATS, but it also defines and gives the SEC general authority to exempt 
systems from being considered an exchange. [FN6] 
These possible interpretations take market developments properly into account. In 
particular, due to the technological developments, it has become more and more difficult 
to seize and submit new systems to the supervisory regime applicable to exchanges or 
broker-dealers. With regard to ATS, which functionally can--depending on the system--be 
considered to be the equivalent of exchanges and which have the possibility of choosing 
between a body treated as exchanges or broker-dealers, a more flexible definition of 
"exchange" was necessary. [FN7] 
*201 A system or entity which only executes some of the functions of an exchange 
will not be considered an exchange. For example, it can be a system that is limited to the 
routing of orders to a market, their execution, or it may offer the matching of orders. 
Furthermore, systems performing typical broker-dealer activities are explicitly excluded 
from the definition of exchange. [FN8] 
As to the structure of the U.S. exchange market, [FN9] only a few exchanges have 
been authorised as National Securities Exchanges [FN10] until today. The authorised 
exchanges are all auction markets. [FN11] One very important stock exchange is the New 
York Stock Exchange (NYSE), which can be considered to be the main exchange. [FN12] 
The Amex exchange on the other hand represents the "minor league". [FN13] Seven other 
exchanges have been authorised. Five of them are known as the "regional exchanges". 
[FN14] When dealing with exchanges and markets participants, the SEC pursues the 
concept of the National Market System (NMS) [FN15] for securities. [FN16] Its efforts to 
facilitate the creation of this market system focus on the reporting systems and the 
organisation of the authorised exchanges, which are to be similar. 
 
2. Auction/dealer markets 
The market systems which can qualify as exchange markets are numerous. [FN17] 
However, the categories mainly follow two types of markets: the agency or auction and 
the dealer market. 
An auction market is a market (such as the NYSE for example [FN18]) in which 
securities are bought and sold by competitive bidding through brokers. [FN19] An auction 
market has only one person for each stock, a specialist, [FN20] who in a centralised 
location or "floor" matches incoming orders to buy and sell each stock. These specialists 
are limited only to one firm's available capital. They offer no research or retail sales 
support. Furthermore, a fee is charged for bringing buyers and sellers together. 
A dealer market is characterised by many dealers or market-makers [FN21] who use 
their own capital, research, retail or system resources to represent a stock. A market-
maker is a firm or principal that maintains a firm bid and offer price in a given security by 
standing ready to buy or sell at publicly- quoted prices and who executes an order. [FN22] 
The market-makers are compensated by the profits on the trades made. However, 
because many market- makers can represent the same stock they can compete fiercely 
amongst each other to buy and sell that stock. 
A dealer market is physically fragmented across the various competitive market- 
maker firms. [FN23] The dealers set the prices and thus provide for the necessary liquidity 
for the market. Due to the competition among the market- makers, the bid and ask 
spreads are tight, but the transactions costs may be higher. [FN24] Furthermore, it may 
be more difficult to find out which prices are offered by other competitors. 
The economic theory attempts to assess how the type of market influences their 
performance. Different comparative analyses of the types of markets already exist. [FN25] 
Contrary to other authorised exchanges in the United States, Nasdaq is a dealer 
market and not an auction market. Nasdaq is a decentralised network of competitive 
market-makers who process orders for their own customers and for other NASD brokers or 
dealers. [FN26] 
 
*202 3. Over-the-counter market 
Basically, the over-the-counter market (OTC) relates to all stocks not traded on a stock 
exchange. [FN27] The over-the-counter market can include different types of securities. 
[FN28] The main distinction between an OTC market and a stock exchange is that trading 
on the OTC market is not centralised and the dealers are normally market-makers in a 
specific security. [FN29] 
An important feature of the OTC market is that it is a dealer market. Due to the 
structure of the market, it is not necessary to purchase a seat on an exchange. [FN30] 
Nowadays, the OTC market is an electronically linked market that comprises thousands of 
geographically dispersed competitive dealer and member firms linked together by 
telephones and computer screens. [FN31] Like the NYSE, the OTC market is more 
adequate to handle small orders than large ones. However, the negotiation of large block 
trades is possible on both markets. [FN32] 
The OTC market, OTC market-makers and member securities firms are regulated by 
the NASD, [FN33] which also is responsible for NASDAQ. As a self-regulatory organisation, 
the NASD relies more on market and competitive forces than on regulation and the rules it 
applies are not complicated. 
 
4. Nasdaq 
The Nasdaq Stock Market Inc. (Nasdaq [FN34]) was first created 30 years ago for the 
purpose of collecting and displaying quotations posted by individual dealers in the over-
the-counter market regulated by the NASD. [FN35] 
Technically, Nasdaq was first thought to be an automated extension of the OTC 
market. Dealers could disseminate bid and offer quotes for securities, but they were free 
to execute the orders. All the transactions were agreed upon over the telephone. [FN36] 
Basically, Nasdaq is a decentralised competing dealer market. The dealers or market-
makers [FN37] use their own capital, research and retail system resources to represent a 
stock. The competitive situation is due to the fact that many market-makers can represent 
the same stock. 
Since 1984, with the introduction of the Small Order Execution System (SOES), it is 
possible to execute small orders automatically against the quotation of a market-maker 
[FN38] at the best bid or offer. Thus, with SOES, the volume has increased as well as the 
efficiency in trading. In 1990, the SelectNet, an online screen negotiation and execution 
service was launched. It enhances opportunities for finding and executing transactions at 
the best prices at greater volume than allowed by SOES. [FN39] 
Ten years later, Nasdaq surpassed the New York Stock Exchange in annual share 
volume and, in 1999, became the largest stock market in the United States. Nasdaq also 
began to implement a global strategy and to restructure its organisation into a 
shareholder-owned, for-profit company. [FN40] The Nasdaq quotation management 
system now collects and displays quotations of registered market-makers and ECNs 
[FN41] that are members of the NASD. [FN42] They constitute its participants. [FN43] 
Nasdaq also collects and displays quotations in Nasdaq securities from Unlisted Trading 
Privileges (UTP) exchanges by agreement. [FN44] Nasdaq's market participants and UTP 
exchanges can enter quotations which are displayed on a quotation montage. This 
montage can be viewed and disseminated to other market participants. [FN45] 
*203 Legally, Nasdaq is overseen by a registered securities association, the NASD, 
and is still not registered as an exchange. [FN46] Nasdaq was first a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of NASD, which acts as a self-regulatory organisation according to section 
19(a)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. However, the role of the NASD as owner 
of Nasdaq was not without its problems. On the one hand, it controlled Nasdaq, which in 
the course of time has become a dominant securities market. On the other hand, it acts as 
a regulatory authority with regard to the ECNs that as a matter of fact compete with 
Nasdaq itself. Thus, this market structure of Nasdaq presented a dilemma and conflict of 
interest were unavoidable for the NASD. [FN47] 
 
5. SuperMontage 
On January 10, 2001, the SEC approved the SuperMontage proposal, [FN48] which will 
radically modify the working of the Nasdaq. It has been operational since October 2002. 
[FN49] 
In order to better understand what SuperMontage is, it is first worth to look at the 
meaning of the word and its composition, particularly the use of "montage". According to 
the Webster's International Dictionary, montage means:  
-- "The act of photographic process of combining several distinct pictures so that 
they often blend with or into each other to produce a composite picture which may or 
may not appear to be made up of separate pictures.  
-- An artistic composition made by combining heterogeneous elements." [FN50]  
As a matter of fact and according to the definition of montage, the SuperMontage is 
composed of different elements, [FN51] each fulfilling other functions within the Nasdaq's 
system. The addition of the prefix "super" most probably indicates that the system will 
offer a new way of trading and will radically modify the existing system. [FN52] 
The goal of SuperMontage is to modernise the existing trading configuration in order to 
improve the competitiveness of Nasdaq both nationally and internationally. The current 
trading platforms and quotation montage of Nasdaq will be completed by a new facility for 
collecting the quotes and orders, the Order Collecting Facility. Furthermore, the Nasdaq 
NMS, the primary Nasdaq trading platform, will be modified. Contrary to the existing 
Nasdaq systems, SuperMontage will offer the possibility of trading all Nasdaq securities on 
it. [FN53] 
Basically, SuperMontage will alter the existing Nasdaq's system and its working 
functions in three principal areas: quote/order collection, quote/order display and 
execution services. [FN54] 
 
a. Quote/Order Collection 
The Order Collection Facility (OCF) will partially eliminate the distinction between 
quotes and orders. It will allow participants to enter either a single quotation or multiple 
quotes or orders at the same or at different price levels. In this case, the best priced 
attributable quotes or orders on the bid and ask sides will be aggregated and a 
participant's displayed quote created. [FN55] The participants will also have the possibility 
of sending Nasdaq only their best quotes or "top of the book". Furthermore, anonymous 
(i.e., non- attributable) quotes or orders may also be entered into the system, but a two- 
sided attributable quote or order must be entered. [FN56] The elements of each quote 
(identity, price, time of entry) will be maintained. The orders may be directed or non-
directed into the system to access quotes or orders through the Order Collection Facility. 
[FN57] A participant may also choose to maintain only his required quotation and not 
enter additional quotes or orders. 
 
b. Display of Quotes/Orders 
Basically, SuperMontage will give more information regarding the quotes and orders 
than the current quotation montage. The additional information will be displayed in two 
ways. [FN58] On the one hand, it will be possible to aggregate the best priced non-
attributable orders or quotes from all participants and to display them in the quotation 
montage as one buy and one sell price together with the best-priced attributable orders or 
quotes of each Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant and UTP Exchange. On the other hand, 
the new system will aggregate all quotes or orders whether *204 they are attributable or 
not at each price level. Furthermore, the three best prices with associated aggregate size 
on each side of the market will be displayed through the Nasdaq Order Display Facility. 
The market data vendors will receive this information and will be able to provide an 
equivalent display service to their customers. [FN59] 
Nasdaq will also give these vendors individual attributable quotes or orders displayed 
in the three best price levels in the Nasdaq Order Display Facility. [FN60] The result of the 
display improvements will be that the investors and other market participants will be able 
to see the aggregate of the interests at three price levels, which are easily provided and 
that the Nasdaq participants will be able voluntarily to enter their "near the market" 
quotes or orders. [FN61] 
These changes will enhance the market transparency of trading interests, because 
more quotes and orders will be displayed than in other systems. [FN62] This will put the 
market participants in a far better position in order to decide which securities to buy or to 
sell. Thus, the already open market structure of Nasdaq will be largely reinforced through 
SuperMontage. 
 
c. Execution Services 
With SuperMontage the SOES and SelectNet services will disappear. The access will be 
replaced with two new processes: a directed order process and a non- directed order 
process. The participants are however also free to use other accessing methods like the 
telephone, direct connections to market-makers or even own execution services provided 
that they ensure an access. [FN63] 
The directed order process will be functionally similar to the current SelectNet service. 
This means that the participants will have the possibility to direct an order to a determined 
Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant or UTP Exchange. The directed order may match a 
quote or order of the recipient or not. In order to avoid double liability, a Nasdaq Quoting 
Market Participant or UTP Exchange can elect to receive directed Liability Orders through 
the OCF. [FN64] 
The non-directed order process will represent the default execution process for 
marketable orders. These orders will be matched with the highest ranked quotes or orders 
of Nasdaq Quoting Market Participants and UTP Exchanges and will be executed 
automatically or delivered to the matched Nasdaq Quoting Participants and UTP 
Exchanges, whereby the way these participants take part in the non- directed order 
process will be determining. [FN65] 
In the non-directed order process, the ranking of Nasdaq Quoting Market participants 
and UTP Exchange quotes or orders is fixed by one of three order execution algorithms. A 
non-directed order entered by a Nasdaq participant will be matched first against its own 
quote or order on the other side of the market, provided that its quote or order is at the 
best bid or offer. The orders may also be addressed to the "preference" of a determined 
Nasdaq Quoting Market Participant or UTP Exchange. [FN66] On the whole, the execution 
services will be more flexible and will offer more possibilities to the market participants. 
 
6. ECNs [FN67] 
Electronic Communications Networks (ECNs) belong to the category of Alternative 
Trading Systems. [FN68] There exist a variety of such systems and their markets normally 
are private. [FN69] ECNs may offer a whole range of services, which are typically based on 
technological developments. Depending on the system, they also can furnish services, 
which normally are or should be provided by registered exchanges. [FN70] In comparison 
to exchanges, the main advantage of ECNs is that the services they offer may be cheaper 
than the ones of an exchange and the execution can be more efficient. This may be due to 
their concentration on only specific functions of exchanges. 
Through ECNs, investors can normally enter orders anonymously into the marketplace. 
ECNs also can provide facilities, which can be used by investors to trade directly with each 
other, and they can offer matching facilities too. Following the *205 introduction of a new 
Regulation for Alternative Trading Systems in 1998, [FN71] these systems now have to be 
recognised by the SEC and can choose to register either as broker-dealers or as 
exchanges. [FN72] 
ECNs normally are linked to exchange systems. In particular, the Nasdaq network 
offers the possibility of connecting ECNs into its market. The participation or membership 
of ECNs to Nasdaq is governed by rule and private contract. [FN73] 
Before the introduction of SuperMontage, ECNs have handled more than 20 per cent of 
the orders in securities listed on Nasdaq. [FN74] ECNs like Instinet [FN75] for example, 
can accept limit orders for Nasdaq issues and offer the possibility of making trades in 
Nasdaq. So public orders can compete with the dealer's bids and offers. [FN76] 
ECNs that are NASD members will also be able to participate in SuperMontage. They 
will have full access to the system for order entry and delivery as well as other functions at 
their disposal. They will also have the possibility to participate in the functions of order 
delivery or automatic execution. [FN77] 
 
III. Analysis 
The authorisation of SuperMontage through the SEC was granted under section 
19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and Rule 19b-4. [FN78] From a legal point 
of view, this authorisation was not problematic. The system belonged to a self-regulatory 
organisation (NASD) and was submitted to the SEC as a change of rules within the NASD. 
[FN79] Due to the complexity and role of Nasdaq within the U.S.-securities market and its 
competitive position with regard to other exchanges, the main question may be, rather, 
whether Nasdaq should be considered an exchange. An authorisation request for 
recognition as an exchange has been submitted in the meantime. [FN80] 
Thus, the main issues raised by SuperMontage do not relate to the internal aspects of 
the system. They principally relate to the external consequences of the system on the 
market and are economic ones. In this context, three areas can be identified: market 
structure, market fragmentation and competition between Nasdaq and ECNs. 
 
1. Market structure 
With regard to market structure, [FN81] SuperMontage may first exercise an influence 
as to the role of *206 self-regulatory organisations, particularly the NASD. SuperMontage 
will directly compete with the ECNs. Some of the functions it will offer will be the same as 
the ones offered by ECNs. Thus, some market participants will prefer to be members of 
SuperMontage only in order to make use of all the advantages of this new system. Most 
probably, some ECNs will become obsolete and disappear. 
In this context, it has to be taken into account that the NASD not only owns and 
supervises Nasdaq--of which SuperMontage is a part--but it also supervises the ECNs, 
which are registered and regulated by it. With the introduction of Nasdaq's SuperMontage, 
the NASD will inevitably be confronted with a conflict of interest. It would then own and 
regulate SuperMontage whilst supervising the ECNs, which will compete amongst each 
other. [FN82] This situation presents the risk to NASD of losing its credibility and authority 
with regard to a lot of the institutes it supervises. [FN83] 
A solution for the ECNs would be for themselves to register as national securities 
associations under section 15A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. This however 
necessitates a certain degree of organisation and creates new duties, so that not all ECNs 
would be willing and administratively able to choose this route. 
The other way to solve this problem is that already chosen by the NASD, which is to 
spin-off Nasdaq [FN84] and have it organised as a profit-making corporation. [FN85] 
However, Nasdaq was exempted from the definition of "exchange" under Rule 3a1-1 
because the NASD operated it. [FN86] So, before the NASD may relinquish control, 
Nasdaq will have to be registered as a national securities exchange, because no exemption 
will apply any more. Practically, this will be realised in the following manner: The NASD 
ownership is in the process of being changed. NASD now will divest itself of all its shares 
of Nasdaq, [FN87] which should become an independent, investor-owned stock market. 
Two private placement sales of shares and warrants [FN88] will shift the voting rights for 
NASD shares underlying warrants to the warrant holders once Nasdaq has been registered 
as an exchange. [FN89] In the meantime, a trustee will vote the NASD shares in Nasdaq 
at the direction of the NASD. [FN90] 
Thus, the main benefits of the registration of Nasdaq as a national securities exchange 
will be that the structure of the market will be improved because Nasdaq will be an 
independent entity. It will be able to concentrate only on trading and will not have to rely 
on the NASD any more, which basically pursues different goals. Nasdaq will also avoid 
potential conflicts with ECNs resulting from the fact that they are supervised by the NASD. 
As a profit-maximising company, Nasdaq will be more adequately able to compete 
nationally and internationally with other exchanges and dispose of a modern structure. The 
NASD will then be able to concentrate only on the supervision of one category of entity, 
broker-dealers. 
 
2. Market fragmentation 
Another issue raised by SuperMontage is the possible effect of the system on market 
fragmentation. [FN91] The impact of the increasing number of *207 ECNs has mainly 
been that multiple market centres have been created. These centres can execute orders, 
but the risk exists that they reduce quote competition and liquidity and therefore prevent 
investors from receiving best execution. [FN92] The centres may be too isolated and the 
disclosure requirements may not be sufficient. 
Basically, in the context of a national market system, the orders should interact with 
each other and the prices should be the result of fierce competition. In particular, the 
secondary markets should ensure that the investors get fair deals and the markets work 
efficiently. [FN93] In the case of multiple market centres, fragmentation may lead to price 
distortion and the inefficient execution of orders, in other words to an imperfect market. 
Furthermore, it will become more difficult for brokers to fulfill their duty of best execution. 
[FN94] 
With view to this situation, the SEC now proposes to enhance market disclosure with 
regard to price transparency. It proposes to create a Consolidated Limit Order Book, which 
would establish price/time priority for all displayed orders in all markets. [FN95] 
The introduction of SuperMontage will most probably represent a concentration of 
trading activities, because the system will offer some of the functions which were first 
offered by the ECNs. Some ECNs will probably disappear because SuperMontage will be 
able to provide services more efficiently and they will also be cheaper. It is also expected 
that SuperMontage will offer a fairer market. It will provide for more liquidity and 
transparency and will enhance the ability to obtain the best execution. [FN96] 
 
3. Competition: Nasdaq versus ECNs 
As already stated, the introduction of SuperMontage means that a centralisation within 
the Nasdaq market will take place. As the market is expected to be more efficient and 
transparent, it should have a positive effect on the execution of orders and thus will 
improve the position of investors. 
With regard to the competition among markets, there is however a risk that 
SuperMontage may have a negative impact. [FN97] An integration of the market will occur 
and SuperMontage will implement a rather monopolistic, centralised execution system. 
However, this should be considered within the historical context of the competitive 
situation existing between Nasdaq and the ECNs. For several years ECNs have 
continuously developed and thus attracted more and more Nasdaq orders. They offered 
technologically better solutions and could also provide for the matching of orders. [FN98] 
Thus, the introduction of SuperMontage is to be understood in the sense that Nasdaq now 
catches up with its own technological solutions. Order flow may even be forced into the 
SuperMontage. [FN99] 
This new situation will increase competition among the market systems and force the 
ECNs to innovate and offer new services. However, it can also be considered to be anti-
competitive, because SuperMontage will be able to cover all the functions of a securities 
market and will neutralise many if not all of the advantages of ECNs. [FN1] In a certain 
way, the system will be quasi self- sufficient and ECNs will lose market share. In order to 
survive, ECNs will have either to create products or build up own competitive markets. 
When evaluating SuperMontage from a competition perspective, the SEC found that 
the system was consistent with the goal of enhancing competition and allowing economic 
forces to interact. According to the Commission, the system is reasonably designed to 
promote price discovery, best execution, liquidity and market innovation, while continuing 
to preserve competition among market centres. [FN2] 
 
*208 IV. Evaluation 
 
1. Market evolution 
The introduction of SuperMontage will represent a basic change within the market 
structure. First, it will enhance the competitive position of the exchanges and reinforce 
their role within the market. As its introduction will probably threaten at least some of the 
existing ECNs, it will probably motivate these systems to offer services most certainly 
based on the development of new technological resources. Thus, a new competitive era is 
going to commence. On the whole, as to the national securities markets, the main 
question may be whether SuperMontage will contribute to the realisation of a National 
Market System or not. 
With regard to international competition among securities markets, this development is 
very positive for the American markets. A lot of financial centres worldwide are still at 
least one step back. They are now discussing and evaluating proposals in order to regulate 
ATSs, i.e. ECNs. [FN3] With the approval of the new rules regarding alternative systems in 
1998 [FN4] and now of SuperMontage, the American securities markets have already 
reached a position where they can develop new and more efficient trading methods than 
the one offered by ATSs. 
 
2. Critique 
The role of the supervisory authority was determining and central, because it was 
responsible for the approval of SuperMontage. In this case, the SEC did not simply 
approve the system, but it first studied the whole market situation according to its duty to 
create and maintain a National Market System for Securities [FN5] and invited the market 
participants to take a position. 
Although the SEC could not have refused the approval of SuperMontage based on legal 
grounds only, [FN6] it may have handled the case in a broad way with regard to a possible 
influence on the market structure. The role of the SEC regarding market structure [FN7] 
should be interpreted restrictively. As some fear, SuperMontage will almost certainly have 
important consequences, particularly for ECNs, and may even threaten their existence. 
However, this is not a strictly legal question, but the question of how far supervisory 
authorities should intervene in guiding or shaping the development of market structure. 
Supervisory authorities should not, as far as possible, intervene in order to shape the 
market and influence future developments through their authorisation practices. Market 
forces should operate without intervention from supervisory authorities. 
 
V. Conclusion 
The issues raised by SuperMontage tend to show that the securities markets work like 
a puzzle. The introduction of new systems like the SuperMontage may first put existing 
markets or their market structure out of balance. 
The SEC was right to approve the SuperMontage proposal. The controversy created by 
SuperMontage relates to the external consequences of the system. The SEC did not have 
to interfere with regard to its economic consequences however. 
With the introduction of SuperMontage, competition within the securities markets will 
be enhanced and market participants will decide which markets and in which form will 
survive, and which ones will disappear or have to develop and offer other, more 
sophisticated functions or services in order to continue. SuperMontage should be 
considered to represent an adaptation of the existing Nasdaq system to technological and 
electronic developments. It may also be considered a positive development for the future 
of exchange trading, as it introduces a new area. 
 
FN I thank Professor William C. Tyson, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, for his 
useful comments. 
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